[Abstract] This paper discusses the financial dynamics of the airline industry by identifying the fundamental cycle periods of profitability and their driving factors. Assuming the industry profit cycles could be modeled as an undamped second-order system, the fundamental cycle period was found to be 11.3 years for the U.S. airline industry and 10.5 years for the world airline industry. An empirical profitability model was estimated and the results revealed that such cycle period is endogenous, neither deregulation nor September 11 have significantly changed the cycle length. To analyze the causes of profit cyclicality, parametric models were developed under the hypothesis that phase lag in the system caused the profit oscillations; and two hypotheses, lag in capacity response and lag in cost adjustment were studied. Analysis of the parametric model of capacity response indicated that the system stability depends on the delay between aircraft orders and deliveries and on the aggressiveness in airplane ordering. Exaggerated capacity response was observed in the simulation as the gain in the model has lumped impacts of exogenous factors, suggesting capacity shortfall alone cannot fully explain the industry dynamics. The model also indicates reducing delay may help to mitigate system oscillations. Simulation results of the parametric model regarding cost adjustment were consistent with profit observations. Finally, a coupled model was developed to study the joint effects of capacity and cost. Simulation results indicated that the coupled model explained industry dynamics better than individual capacity or cost models, suggesting that the system behavior is driven by the joint effects of capacity response and cost adjustment. 
I. Introduction
HE air transportation in the United States has experienced rapid development through boom-and-bust cycles, particularly since deregulation in 1978. Prior to 1978, the airline industry resembled a public utility; the routes each airline flew and the fares they charged were regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 1 . As the Airline Deregulation Act eliminated CAB's authority over routes and domestic fares, the airline industry transformed into a market-oriented sector, driven by the dynamics between demand and supply.
Deregulation has promoted the development of air transportation system; as shown in Fig. 1 3 , and the operating capacity of the industry grew on average 4% per year between 1980 and 2000. Despite the rapid growth, the net financial results of the industry exhibited a significantly different behavior. The annual operating revenues and expenses 4 of the U.S. major, national and regional passenger and cargo airlines have grown with traffic ( Fig. 2) , whereas the industry profits 4 ( Fig. 3 ) have oscillated around zero with growing amplitude, suggesting that fundamental changes took place in the industry since deregulation. In recent down cycle, the industry has lost over 23 billion dollars accumulatively in 2001, 2002 and 2003 , outpacing the total earnings of the past. Many airlines have suffered intense financial losses. In past five years, major airlines, such as United Airlines, US Airways, ATA Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and Delta Air Lines, have filed bankruptcy protection. By contrast, the industry was profitable most of the time before deregulation even in the down cycles (Fig. 3) . It should be noted that data in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 were evaluated in constant 2000 dollars to eliminate the inflation effects. Unless otherwise noted, all financial data in this study is referred to 2000 dollars.
The above observation of growing profit oscillations after deregulation could not be simply explained by traffic or capacity growth. Shown in Fig. 4 are the unit profits of the industry since deregulation. The unit profit was derived from normalizing the net profit with respect to ASM of the year to eliminate the effect of capacity increase on profit growth. Again, the amplitude of oscillating unit profits has grown over the cycles since deregulation.
Moreover, similar observation is also seen in the world airline industry. As the wave of liberalizing air transportation spreads globally, the world air traffic and capacity have grown rapidly since the late 1970s. Shown in Fig. 5 are the annual traffic (RPK) and operating capacity (ASK) of the world airlines recorded by ICAO 5 . The annual growth rate of capacity averaged 4.7% during the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, the net profits of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics world airlines again have oscillated with increasing amplitude over the years since the late 1970s (Fig. 6) 
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. Although the cyclical behavior of the airline industry has been widely noticed by industry professionals and external financial investors, majority of the researches focused on the dynamics between orders and deliveries of commercial jets 6, 7 , with little on the fundamental cycle period of industry profitability and its causes. The financial crisis facing the U.S. airlines in 2001-2003 has highlighted the volatility and oscillation of industry profits as a key issue for the stability of airline industry. The objective of this study is to understand the dynamics of airline industry by identifying the fundamental cycle periods of industry profitability as well as the driving factors.
The study took a system approach to analyze the profitability of airline industry. Assuming the oscillating profits resemble an undamped second-order system, a spectrum analysis was conducted to identify the fundamental cycle periods, followed by the estimation of empirical profitability models of the U.S. and world airline industries. To explore the causes of profit cyclicality, parametric models were developed under the hypothesis that phase lag in the system causes profit oscillations; and two hypotheses, lag in capacity response and lag in cost adjustment were examined first separately and later jointly. A root locus analysis was performed to explain the system stability and simulations were executed to verify the hypotheses. Last, a coupled model was developed to assess the joint effects of capacity response and cost adjustment. 
II. Fundamental Cycle Periods and Empirical Models of the Profitability of Airline Industries

A. Fundamental Cycle Periods of the Profitability of Airline Industries
Signal detection approach was used to identify the fundamental cycle period T of the profitability of airline industry. Viewing historical profit data of airline industry as a set of noisy signals containing information about the system characteristics, Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) was applied to the profit data to identify the fundamental frequency of the system. Detailed discussion of DFT analysis can be found in Ref. 8 on pages 24-25.
Annual profit data of the U.S. airlines between 1980 and 2002 were analyzed, and the fundamental frequency of the profitability of the U.S. airline industry was found to be 0.0938/year (Fig. 7) . Seen in the figure, the magnitude of the fundamental frequency is about 6dB higher than that of the second frequency, meaning that the magnitude of the fundamental frequency is approximately twice of that of the second frequency. The corresponding fundamental cycle period is therefore 10.7 years, the reciprocal of the fundamental frequency.
Similarly, annual profit data of the world airline industry between 1978 and 2002 were analyzed, and the fundamental frequency of the world airlines was found to be 0.099/year. Again, the magnitude is about 6dB higher or in other words twice stronger than that of the second frequency. Correspondingly, the fundamental cycle period of the profitability of the world airline industry is 10.1 years.
B. Hypothesis and Estimation of Empirical Profitability Models of Airline Industries
The profit oscillations of the U.S. airline industry since deregulation resembled an undamped second-order system (Fig. 3) . Assuming the profitability of airline industry can be modeled as an undamped second-order system, the general form of the profitability model is American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nonlinear least square regression was employed to estimate the net profit model specified in Eq. (1) from industry profit data. The profit data were evaluated in constant 2000 dollars in regression and the best estimation was obtained through iterations. The fundamental cycle periods identified by DFT analysis were served as initial values of T in Eq. (1) for the U.S. and world airline industries respectively to initiate the iteration and assure the solution convergence.
C. Profitability Model of the U.S. Airline Industry before Deregulation
To represent the fact that the U.S. airline industry was profitable most of the time before deregulation (Fig. 3) , the general profitability model in Eq. (1) was modified by adding an intercept. Further, since the profits exhibited nearly steady oscillating amplitude before deregulation, the exponential term was removed from Eq. (1) by assuming the e-folding time approximates infinity. Consequently, the modified profitability model is proposed below
where C 0 is the intercept.
Annual net profit data 4 
Impact of Deregulation on the Profitability of the U.S. Airline Industry
Deregulation in 1978 had a profound influence on the U.S. airline industry. Comparison of above two models indicates that deregulation changed the e-folding time significantly. The pre-deregulation model in Eq. (3) implies an infinite e-folding time, while this parameter becomes finite in Eq. (4) for post-deregulation circumstance. As a result, dramatically different behavior was witnessed before and after deregulation. Figure 9 illustrates an oscillation with constant amplitude whereas Figure 10 projects the industry profit to oscillate with increasing amplitude. Moreover, the oscillation amplitudes differ in magnitude as well. The amplitude of profit oscillation before deregulation is approximately 1 billion dollars, much lower than the amplitude in post-deregulation case (Fig. 10) .
However, comparisons of the two models reveal that the fundamental cycle periods before and after deregulation were almost identical, approximately 11 years. This suggests that although deregulation had a strong influence on the oscillation amplitude, it did not change the fundamental profit cycle period of the U.S. airline industry. 
Impact of September 11 on the Profitability of the U.S. Airline Industry
The September 11 terrorist attack had severely affected the air transportation system in the United States. To evaluate its impact on profit cyclicality, the profitability model was estimated again in Eq. (5) 
F. Assumptions and Limitations of Empirical Profitability Models
It is worth to note that although the profitability models estimated above have obtained reasonably good correlation with historical profit data, above empirical models are not able to address causality and/or future constraints. It is clear that future industry growth will be limited at some point, probably by capital investment as the industry becomes less-appealing to investors due to losses in the down cycle, and/or by capacity and traffic demand as the system reaches the limit of the national aerospace system in the up cycle. Caution must be taken in applying these models to predict future system behavior and interpreting the projection results. Nevertheless, these models offer insight on the profit cyclicality of airline industries.
III. Parametric Model for Capacity
It is known that the presence of phase lag or delay in a control system causes oscillations and tends to make the system less stable. Two potential sources of phase lag were observed through extensive data examination: (1) lag between capacity response and profits, and (2) lag between cost adjustment and profits. This section analyzes the relationship between capacity and profitability, and discusses a parametric model based on the capacity hypothesis. The impact of lag between cost adjustment and profitability will be discussed in the next section.
A. Data Analysis of World Commercial Jet Orders and Deliveries
The relationship between industry profitability and world commercial jet orders and deliveries is illustrated in Fig. 13 through Fig. 15 . Figure 13 depicts the world commercial jet airplane orders and deliveries to scheduled passenger and cargo airlines operating worldwide as recorded by ICAO 5 ; approximately a two-year time shift can be observed between aircraft orders and deliveries. Figure 14 describes the relationship between world aircraft deliveries and net profits; a delay of approximately three years is observed between delivery peaks and profit peaks.
To assess the average delay, annual deliveries were further regressed with respect to annual profits and traffic (RPK) with several years of delay assumed. As shown in Eq. (7), the delivery in year t has the best correlation when average three years of delay was assumed for RPK and profit. The correlation coefficient is 0.90. In addition to the delay observation, an asymmetric effect was found between world aircraft orders and net profits. Figure 15 shows that the world annual aircraft orders either grow with the profits of prior year when the industry is profitable or follow a flat trend otherwise. A first-order approximation of this asymmetric effect indicates that the slope of aircraft orders with respect to the prior-year profits averages about 147 airplane orders per year for each billion dollars of profits, whereas the flat trend is about 350 airplane orders per year regardless of the magnitude of losses. 
B. Capacity Hypothesis and Parametric Model for Capacity
The existence of phase lag or delay will cause the system to oscillate. From above data analysis, approximately 3-year delay was observed between aircraft deliveries and profitability of the world airline industry. The capacity hypothesis was that the phase lag in capacity response caused the oscillation in profits of airline industry.
A parametric model was developed based on the capacity hypothesis and the block diagram is shown in Fig. 16 . The output of the model is the capacity offered by the system that has units of available seat-miles (ASM). The input of the model is the demand, i.e., desired capacity, which also has units of available seatmiles. The difference between the demand and the capacity is capacity shortfall, which again has units of available seat-miles. Airlines order airplanes based on the capacity shortfall and their ordering strategies. The control gain K in the model represents the overall aggressiveness in the ordering process, and has units of ASM ordered per year per unit ASM shortfall. The delay D represents the lag between capacity shortfall and deliveries in the system and has units as years. Assuming airlines' pricing activity is based on capacity shortfall, capacity shortfall is correlated with profits through constant C, and the delay D also represents the lag between profits and deliveries. Because of the delay, the new deliveries will not be added into the total capacity until D years later. The closed-loop transfer function of the capacity parametric model is American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics where ω crit is the critical frequency at which the system oscillates with constant amplitude, Τ crit is the critical cycle period and Κ crit is the critical gain corresponding to ω crit respectively.
The relationship between the system stability and the values of delay and gain implied by the root-locust analysis is better illustrated in Fig. 18 . The line in the figure indicates the boundary that maintains the system stability. Systems on the boundary will just oscillate with constant amplitude and hold the relationship described in Eq. (9) . Shown in Fig. 17 , the system will become unstable when its poles cross over the imaginary axis and enter into the right-hand side of s-plane, i.e., when ω > ω crit and/or Κ > Κ crit . This corresponds to the area in Fig. 18 that is above the stability boundary. Systems in this area will oscillate exponentially. The area below the stability boundary represents the stable region and corresponds to the left-hand side of s-plane in Fig. 17 . Therefore, the system stability is dependent on the delay and gain values and its location on the map in Fig. 18 . To understand the profit stability of airline industry, it is necessary to determine the parameters that represent the U.S. and world airline industries and locate them on the map.
Determining Parameters in Parametric Model for Capacity
In order to use profit data to calculate the delay and gain values in the capacity parametric model, it is necessary to relate profits to capacity shortfall. A linear relationship was assumed in Eq. (10) that the aggregate industry profits are proportional to the capacity shortfall (Fig. 16) .
Figure 18. System Stability and Delay and Gain Values in Parametric Model for Capacity of the U.S. and World Airline Industries.
Such assumption implies that profit has the same characteristic equation as capacity shortfall, and consequently has the same oscillation frequency and damping ratio as capacity shortfall. Therefore, it enables ones to use the fundamental cycle period T and e-folding time τ (11) Using Eq. (11), the delay and gain values for the U.S. and world airlines were computed from the e-folding time τ and fundamental cycle period T that were estimated previously. The results are summarized in Table 1 , including the critical gain that is calculated with respect to delay using Eq. (9). The delay and gain values of the U.S. and world airline industries are also plotted in Fig. 18 .
Seen from the table, the computed delay for the world airline industry is 2.8 years. This is consistent with the observed average 3-year delay between the profits of the world airline industry and airplane deliveries. The consistency indicates that capacity could influence profits. The gain for the world airline industry is 0.73 annual ASM ordered per ASM shortfall, that is, 73% of capacity shortfall is fulfilled annually. The gain is about 30% larger than the critical value. Similarly, the computed delays for the U.S. airlines before and after deregulation are consistent or close to the observed average 3-year delay for world airplane deliveries. However, the gain for the U.S. airline industry after deregulation is approximately twice the critical gain. By contrast, the computed gain for the U.S. airline industry before deregulation is equal to the critical value, representing a system that oscillates with constant amplitude. As seen from Fig. 18 , the point representing the U.S. airline industry before deregulation is located right on the stability boundary, whereas the points for the U.S. airline industry post deregulation and the world airline industry all fall in the unstable region. Moreover, the point representing the U.S. airline industry post deregulation is positioned further from the stability boundary than that for the world airline industry, indicating it's more unstable than the latter. 
Factors Contributing to Delay and Gain Values in Parametric Model for Capacity
The delay in the airline industry primarily consists of the decision time in placing orders, order processing time and manufacturing lead-time.
Factors contributing to the high gains may include:
• Optimism in total capacity projection that amplifies the capacity shortfall;
• Collective market share perspective is greater than 100%. The collective market share perspective represents the aggregate effect of individual airlines' projections in market share. For individual airlines, the management usually makes fleet plans based on the market share and traffic projections. Consequently, the collective market share perspective in each competing O-D market and in total capacity could easily exceed 100%, resulting over-capacity at industry-level; • Aggressiveness when the manufacturers pursue orders. This can happen when a manufacturer offers special deals to particular airlines or markets for the sake of market penetration and/or the market share of the manufacturer; • Exogenous factors. Because of the simplicity of the parametric model, the gain has lumped impacts of exogenous factors, such as, the positive impact of high GDP growth on traffic and the negative impact of economic recession and/or war on demand, as well as the influence of fuel price fluctuations on profits.
D. Simulation of Parametric Model for Capacity of Airline Industries 1. Simulation of Capacity of the U.S. Airline Industry
The capacity of the U.S. airline industry was simulated by running the capacity parametric model (Fig. 16 ) with delay and gain values from the U.S. post-deregulation condition ( Table 1 ). The input demand was assumed to grow at 4% per year, the average ASM growth rate of the U.S. airline industry since deregulation (Fig. 1) . The simulation starting time was 1980 when the industry profit was near zero, implying certain equilibrium achieved between demand and supply. Figure 19 shows the simulation results of demand and capacity in comparison with ATA capacity data. Figure 20 shows the results of capacity shortfall plus industry net profits to illustrate the relationship between capacity shortfall and profits. Seen from Fig. 20 , according to the simple capacity parametric model, the industry was approximately 550 billion ASMs under-capacity in 1998 whereas approximately 1,000 billion ASMs over-capacity in 2003; the capacity shortfall has grown through the cycles. The exponentially oscillating behavior in capacity shortfall is generally consistent with industry profits. However, the capacity simulation in Fig. 19 overshoots the observed variation in capacity data. This indicates that capacity shortfall alone is not sufficient to explain industry profit oscillations.
As discussed before, aggregate industry profits were related to capacity shortfall in order to determine the delay and gain values in the parametric model. If the behavior were solely due to capacity shortfall, constant C in Eq. (10) would have the implication of cost or incentive for adding or removing additional capacity. From the simulations results in Fig. 20 , constant C can be estimated by regressing the profit data with respect to capacity shortfall via least-square. The value of constant C was found to be approximate 1 cent (2000$) per ASM in capacity shortfall, implying that the cost or incentive for adding or removing one available seat-mile to fulfill the capacity shortfall will lead to approximately one cent (2000$) in loss or profit. It should be pointed out that such estimation is preliminary given the simplicity of the model; however, it illustrates the potential interaction between capacity and profit. 
Simulation of Capacity of the World Airline Industry
The capacity of the world airline industry was also simulated by setting the delay and gain in the parametric model to the values for the world airlines in Table 1 . The demand growth rate was assumed to be 4.7%, the average worldwide ASK growth rate (Fig. 5) . Again the simulation starting time was 1980.
Simulation results of demand and capacity of the world airlines are shown in Fig. 21 in comparison with ICAO capacity data. The model also simulates the aircraft orders in terms of ASMs, as shown in the block diagram (Fig.  16) . In order to compare the results with historical airplane order data, simulated aircraft orders in ASMs were converted to aircraft unit orders by dividing the average aircraft utility. The average aircraft utility of the U.S. airlines, that was 190 million ASMs per aircraft per year as discussed in Appendix A of Ref. 8 , was used in the conversion. The converted order simulations are shown in Fig. 22 , in comparison with the world airplane order data from ICAO and the baseline order that was 350 aircraft per year shown in Fig. 15 . Again, the capacity simulation in Figure 21 overshoots the observed variation in capacity data. Seen from Figure 22 , the simulation of orders is generally consistent with world aircraft orders. The average of the simulation results is above zero, partially reflecting the asymmetric effect between profitability and aircraft orders shown in Fig. 15 . 
E. Mitigating System Oscillations
The parametric capacity model was also used to explore potential ways to mitigate system oscillations. The stability relationship shown in Fig. 18 suggests that the system could be stabilized by reducing delay and gain below the stability boundary. As an illustration, simulations were performed with different delays while holding the gains unchanged, and results of different delay values are shown in Fig. 23 for the U.S. airline industry and in Fig. 24 for the world airline industry. The results indicate that if the gain is held unchanged, the capacity of the U.S. airline industry would become stabilized if the delay were reduced from 3.2 years to 1.8 years. Similarly, the world capacity would stabilize if the delay were reduced from 2.8 year to 2.2 years. 
IV. Parametric Model for Cost
A. Unit Net Profit Analysis
Assuming the unit net profits of the U.S. airline industry after deregulation (Fig. 4) resembled an undamped second-order system, the unit net profit model of the industry was estimated in Eq. (12) Figure 27 shows the unit operating expenses and unit net profits of all U.S. airlines after deregulation. Comparing to Fig. 26 , a delay of approximately three years is observed between the peaks of unit operating expenses and the peaks of unit net profits as well as between the troughs of these two variables.
The cost hypothesis was that the phase lag between cost adjustment and profits caused system oscillation. 
Parametric Model for Cost
A parametric model was developed based on the cost delay hypothesis with the block diagram shown in Fig.  28 . According to Appendix B of Ref. 8, CASM was separated into two components: CASM1 -profitsensitive component and CASM2 -less profit-sensitive part. The system has two inputs: RASM and CASM1; both having long-term decreasing trends (Fig. 26) . The difference between RASM and CASM gives the output -profit per ASM (PASM). Based on PASM, cost Comparing Eq. (8) and Eq. (13), one can see the two parametric models share the same characteristic equation. Therefore, Equation (11) was able to be used again to obtain the delay and gain values in the cost parametric model that are summarized in Table 2 and Fig. 29 . Figure 29 shows that the U.S. airline industry post-deregulation again falls in the unstable region Overall, the simulation results indicated that the cost parametric model captures the system behavior reasonably well. The model identified cost adjustment is another potential driving factor of the system behavior, in additional to the capacity response factor. 
A. Coupled Model Combining Capacity and Cost Effects
Shown in Fig. 34 is the coupled model that combines capacity and cost effects. The model was formed primarily by joining the capacity model in Fig. 16 and the cost model in Fig. 28 . The output of the model is the total profit, the product of capacity and unit profit (PASM). The capacity and cost effects are coupled through two feedbacks from the profit: one fed to the order aggressiveness K 1 and the other to the profit-sensitive part of CASM. Following the process described in Chapter 7 of Ref. 8, the model was calibrated with respect to the historical capacity, profit, PASM and CASM data of the U.S. airline industry between 1980 and 2000, with results summarized in Table 3 .
B. Simulation Results
Figures 35 through 39 depict the simulation results of the calibrated model of the U.S. airline industry in terms of capacity, fleet size, CASM, profit, and aircraft orders. The simulation assumed ASMs growing at 4%, RASM decreasing at 1.7% and CASM1 decreasing 2% per year respectively, i.e., each of them evolving along its respective trend shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 26 . The simulation of the U.S. fleet (Fig. 36) . To verify the reasonableness of parameter estimates, particularly the value of K 2 , the assumed U.S. orders (35% of world orders) are further plotted against prior-year profits in Fig. 40 as well as the simulation results. The figure shows that when the airlines are profitable, the slope of simulated aircraft orders with respect to the profits is in the neighborhood of the observed slope from actual data shown in Fig. 15 , suggesting the estimate of K 2 -effect of profitability on order aggressiveness is reasonable.
Overall, as can be seen from the figures, the coupled model interprets the industry dynamics reasonably well in terms of capacity growth, fleet size, CASM, profitability, and the effect of profitability on airplane orders. The coupled model explains industry dynamics better than individual capacity or cost parametric models, suggesting that the system behavior is driven by the joint effects of capacity response and cost adjustment. 
VI. Conclusion
This paper discusses the financial dynamics of the airline industry by identifying the fundamental cycle periods of profitability and their driving factors. Assuming the industry profit cycles could be modeled as an undamped system, the fundamental cycle period was found to be 11.3 years for the U.S. airline industry and 10.5 years for the world airline industry. An empirical profitability model was last estimated based on the fundamental cycle period, and the results revealed that such cycle period is endogenous. Deregulation did not change the cycle period however had a strong influence on the oscillation amplitude. Similarly, exogenous shocks like the September 11 terrorist attack exacerbated the industry profitability but did not significantly change the profit cycle period. Although the empirical models offer insights on profit cyclicality of airline industry, it does not address causality and/or constraints where the industry growth will likely reach in the future. Therefore, care must be taken in applying the models to predict future system behavior To analyze the causes of profit cyclicality, parametric models were developed under the hypothesis that phase lag in the system caused the profit oscillations; and two hypotheses, lag in capacity response and lag in cost adjustment were studied. Analysis of the parametric model of capacity response indicated that the system stability depends on the delay between aircraft orders and deliveries and the aggressiveness in airplane ordering. Exaggerated capacity response was observed in the simulation as the gain in the model has lumped impacts of exogenous factors, suggesting capacity shortfall alone cannot fully explain the industry dynamics. The model also indicates reducing delay may help to mitigate system oscillations. Simulation results of the parametric model regarding cost adjustment were consistent with profit observations. Finally, a coupled model was developed to study the joint effects of capacity and cost. Simulation results indicated that the coupled model explained industry dynamics better than individual capacity or cost models, suggesting that the dynamics of the industry is driven by the joint effects of capacity response and cost adjustment.
